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Introduction
The dramatic  abandonment  of  central  planning  as principal  mode of
organizing  economic  activities  in  Russia, Central  and  Eastern Euro-
pean Bloc  and  the  mainland  China  has sparked scholars'  interest  in
economics  of transition.1. Unfortunately,  more  than 10 years after the
collapse of the  Berlin  Wall, we are still  relatively  ignorant  of the eco-
nomics  of transition  (Roland  2001). Significant  disagreements regard-
ing the issues of transition  still remain.  Despite  growing  literature  on
transition  in recent  years, there  is still little  discussion the  about con-
cept of transition.2  Suffice  it to say that there is no theory to guide  the
practical  process of  transition,  only theories  of capitalism and social-
ism (Havrylyshyn 2001). Kornai  (2000) even goes further  to claim that
.An  earlier  version  of this  paper  was  presented  at the  international  conference  on  Evolution  of Institutions
and  the  Knowledge  Economy  organized  by  the  University  of  Debrecen  at Debrecen.  Hungary  (4  -5
October  2002).  The  author  acknowledges  Dian  Kwan  for  her  encouragement  for  this  research  and  for
proofreading  this  paper.  He  also  benefited  from  the  discussion  with  Gary  Shiu.
..The  author  holds  a  Ph.D.  in  Economics  and  Management  from  the  University  of  New  South  Wales.
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1 According  to  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  (2001).  transition  economies  including  Common-
wealth  of  Independent  States,  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  China  and  Mongolia  account  for 17.5  percent
of  the  world  output  and  27.8  percent  of  the  world  population.
2  The  term  "transition  economies"  seems  not  yet clearly  defined  in the literature.  Most  conventional  view
implicitly  defines  a transition  economy  as  an  economy  moving  toward  a  market  style  of  economy  (IMF
2001)  IMF  (2001)  constructs  an  aggregate  transition  indicator  to  show  the  extent  of  these  economies
toward  a  market  economy.  In  the  Austrian  perspective,  Colombatto  (2002)  defines  "transition  as  the
period  of  time  it takes  for  new  institutions  and  organizations  to  be  introduced  and  upheld,  for  agents  to
learn  how  to  operate  according  to  a  reformed  system  of  property  rights  and  adjust  to  hitherto  virtually
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transition  by definition  does not need a' paradigm  or theory-only  the
beginning  and end-point  systems  do.
The  mainstream neoclassical economists regard transition  econo-
mies as suffering  from  severe economic  distortion.3  Therefore,  their
main  objective  is to advise these economies  "to  get the prices  right."
Ignoring  genuine  uncertainty,  learning,  and  the  process of  change,
they equate  equilibrium  with  economic  stability.4 In  the  neoclassical
view, transition  occurs between two equilibrium  states and is unstable.
Transition  economies eventually need to move toward a stable equilib-
rium.  For instance, Roland and Verdier  (2000) draw attention  to a so-
cial coordination  problem  associated with  law enforcement  in transi-
tion  economies.  Their  model  concludes  that  multiple  equilibra  can
occur. Hence, for Roland  and Verdier,  a policy prescription  for  transi-
tion  economies  is to e'liminate  bad equilibrium.  In  general,  the  neo-
classical policy package is designed to transform  transition  economies
from  centrally  planned  economies  operating  under  the  socialist  sys-
tem into  ~arket-type  economies  operating  under  the capitalist  system
in  a democratic  political  framework.  Neglecting  institutional  issue,
neoclassical authors believe that "once central planning was swept away,
it was taken for granted  that the  opening  of markets would  bring  with
it-rather  quickly  and painlessly-the  needed  institutional  structures
to  market  the  new market  system work  properly"  (Hare  2001).  The
mainstream  neoclassical view has been taken up by influential  interna-
tional  policymakers  represented  by the  Washington  Consensus5  and
was dominant  at the beginning  of the  transition  period  in Central and
Eastern  Europe.  Focusing  on  allocative  efficiency,  the  Washington
Consensus view has strong  faith  in  social engineering  (Roland  2001).
A striking  feature  of the economic  strategies and policies  given to tran-
sition  economies  by these western economic  advisors is the  extent  to
which they are grounded  in neoclassical economic  theory and divorced
from  the  historical  legacies, and the related  political  and  social reali-
ties  (Weisskopf 1997).  Built  upon  the  neoclassical price  theories  and
stabilization  policy,  the  Washington  Consensus view fails  to  come to
grips with the historical  legacy of these societies, and therefore  unable~
"In  particular,  Kierzkowski  (1997)  argues  that  transition  is a "move  from  a position  well  inside  the  'produc-
tion  possibility  frontier'  to a  more  efficient  position  closer  to the  frontier."  Similar  neoclassical  approach  is
applied  by Havrylyshyn  (2001).
.For  an  entrepreneurial  critique  of  mainstream  neoclassical  policies  on development,  see  Yu (1998).
.The  Washington  Consensus  view  is in general  associated  with  the  views  of the  IMF  and  World  Bank.  It
was  initially  coined  by  John  Williamson  in  1990  (Roland  2001).Yu 257
to  explain  many of the  phenomena  that  have occurred  in  transition
economies.  Not  surprisingly,  these policymakers  have been  shocked
by the huge fall  in output  after price  liberalization  and the continuous
economic  decline  in Russia and  other  countries  of the  former  Soviet
Union.
Contributions  from  new institutional  economics6
In recent years, new institutional  economics, evidenced  by the success
of China's  reform,  has gained  much ground  in the  transition  debate.
Underscoring  the  process  of change  and  transaction  costs, the  new
institutional  theory  focuses on one  important  element  of economic
change, namely, the  structure  of property  rights,  which  sets the con-
straints or rules  for people  to compete  and exchange.'  In the  new in-
stitutional  perspective,  it can be argued  that  transition  occurs when a
set of property  rights  of  an economy transforms  into  another  set, or
more  specifically,  from  one  type of  incentives  to  another.  Since the
change  in  the  structure  of  property  rights  takes time,  the  transition
period  is therefore  a long and evolutionary  process. Though  the  new
institutional  perspective  is undoubtedly  much  closer to  reality  than
the  neoclassical mathematical  modeling  in  explaining  transition  phe-
nomena,  it  does  not  escape some  neoclassical pitfalls  articulated  in
the concept  of efficiency  and equilibrium.  Using the  concept of trans-
action  costs, new institutional  scholars argue  that  the  communist  re-
gime is inefficient  and therefore  should  be abandoned.  They strongly
endorse  market  mechanism,  which  builds  upon  the  private  property
rights, as a mean of  organizing  economic  activities.  So for  new institu-
tional  scholars,  transition  implies  a change  from  the  communist  re-
gime  (communal  property  rights)  to the market  system (private prop-
erty rights).  They accordingly  prescribe  a policy package of liberaliza-
tion of economies and privatization  of state-owned enterprises. Though
the new institutional  view has provided  us with a better understanding
of transition,  human  agency has never been its center of analysis. More
specifically,  they generally ignore  entrepreneurship,  human  creativity
and learning,  though  some of  recent  transaction  costs literature  have
begun to pay more  attention  to a mental construct.8 More  importantly,
.Roland  (2001)  terms  new  institutional  economics  as  the  evolutionary  institutional  view.
7 The  property  rights  approach  to  transition  has  become  very  popular  in  recent  years  (Le  Journal  des
Economistes  ef des  Etudes  Humaines  2001)
.For  example.  see  Denzau  and  North  (1994);  Mantzavinos  et al  (2001).258 PHIi.IPPINE  JOURNAL  OF DEVELOPMENT
new institutional  economists  are never interested  in  asking why com-
munism was taken place at the beginning.  As Popovic  (2001) correctly
asks in a transition  forum,  "what is the driving  force  of an institutional
reform?"  It should be stressed that it is imaginative  human agency that
breaks dpwn an old  system and creates a new one. Utilizing  the trans-
action  costs concept,  new institutional  economists  may be able to  ex-
plain  in general the direction  of change, but not the origin  of change.
Moreover, if we take the  notion  of human  creativity  seriously, then  all
economic  systems  are unique.  No regime  in the real world  is identical
because no two human  races interpret  things  in the same way. In this
sense,  all transition  economies move into  an unknown  future  (see suc-
ceeding  discussion).  Given  human  creativeness,  each  transition
economy is heading  toward  something  that its people  do not  know in
advance, and the  market  system may not be the  final  destination  for
these transition  economies.
In  this paper, a cognitive  perspective  of  transition  is presented.
Hithertq,  little  research has been conducted  in this  subjectivist  para-
digm. Tije  only recent work that I am aware of;  is by Colombatto  (2002),
who  att~mpts  to  explain  transition  in  Austrian  economics.  Adopting
the Hayekian view, he analyzes transition  in terms of three  criteria:  1)
acquisition  of knowledge,  2) individual  responsibility,  3) and free  en-
try into  the  market place.  In Colombatto's  view, transition  economies
should  be subordinate  to the  analysis of the changes in the  opportu-
nity  sets  and to the willingness  of the actors to take advantages of such
new opportunities.  Accordingly,  an external  shock is perceived  as the
moment  when  new sets of opportunities  are made available to the in-
dividual.  Colombatto  has  correctly  analyzed  transition  in  terms  of
knowledge  problems-the  element  that  Austrian  economists  always
emphasize.  However,  focusing  on  opportunities  and  constraints,
Colombatto's  arguments  look very similar to the new institutional  view.
Colombatto,  unfortunately,  has not  explained  transition  in  Austrian
subjectivism  in the full  extent.  In this paper, transition  is defined  as a
process of transforming  the society's stock of knowledge.  The  novelty
of  this  paper is that  transition  is explained  in terms of  cognitive  ele-
ments s~ch as perception,  learning,  errors, expectation,  experimenta-
tion,  an<!1  creativity.
The  cognitive  approach  to  transition  developed  in  this  paper
builds  upon  theory of human  action and starts with a mental construct.
Thus  human  institutions,  or society's stocks ofkn,owledge,  are viewed
as the  upintended  consequence  of  coordinating  effort  of  human  ac-Yu  I  259
tion.9 Transition  means change  in  institutions,  which  is the  result of
change  in people's  perception.  Stability  in institutions  refers  to  the
situation  that  people  collectively  articulate  the  same stock of  social
knowledge  and make similar  interpretation  to the external world with-
out  any difficulty.  This  framework  will  shed  light  on  two  important
issues: 1) the resistance of change during  the transition  period  and 2)
the  debate  between  two types of  reforms,  namely, "gradualism"  and
"shock therapy."  In  the  section  that follows,  a theoretical  framework
of  transition  in  term  of  human  perception,  learning,  and subjective
interpretation  is constructed.  This  framework  is applied  to  explain
the  meaning  and  the  nature  of  transition,  and some economic  phe-
nomena  observed in  transition  economies.
Experience,  stock of knowledge  and the formation
of  interpretation  framework
The  cognitive  theory  of  transition  constructed  in this  paper  centres
on human agency. Starting  from  the contributions  of Max Weber and
Alfred  Schutz, it has been argued that action has the meaning attached
to  it as human  agents make sense of  their  everyday life  (Weick 1969;
1995).  Making  sense of  the  external  world  means interpretation.lO
Coordination  involves  the  understanding  of  actions  and  interpreta-
tion  of the  meaning  of  other  actors.  Everyday life  builds  on the  cat-
egory of the  "other"  (Weigert  1981). Individuals  find  themselves re-
lated to the surrounding  world  to create a meaningful  life and share it
with  others. Therefore,  action  is essentially inter-subjective,  since all
human  agents find  their  experiences  necessarily reaching  out to the
existence of other persons. People are taken to be "other  I's" just as I
am experienced  as an "another  you."  Only  in this way can "we" make
sense. As Weigert  (1981)  puts  it,  "interpretation  is a process of per-
ceiving  the  other  and  his  or  her  interaction  within  symbolic  frame-
works so that we can make some sense out  of  what the  other  is do-
ing  If we cannot  make any sense out of  the other's  inte;raction,  it
may be that there  is no sense in it, or worse, it may be that there  is no
sense in me."
.Carl  Menger  first  used  the  terms  economizing  man  in his Principles  of Economics  (1994[1871  ]).  In the
same  vein,  Hayek  argues  that  human  institutions  are  the  unintended  consequence  of  economizing  hu-
man  action  In Austrian  tradition,  since  economizing  means  coordination  (Yu 1999),  it is more  correct  to
claim  that  human  institutions  are  the  unintended  consequence  of coordinating  efforts  of  human  action.
10  There  are  some  differences  between  interpretation  and  sensemaking  (Weick  1995).PHILIPPINE  JOURNAL  OF DEVELOPMENT 260
Experiences  from  everyday life  are accumulated  into  a stock of
knowledge  that  can  be used  to  interpret  incoming  events.  Human
agents find,  at any given time, a stock of knowledge  at hand  that serves
as a scheme of  interpretation  of  their  past and  present  experiences,
and  determines  their  anticipation  of  things  to  come  (Schutz  1970).
When we experience,  our  knowledge  grows. II Experiences  enter  the
individual's  consciousness via everyday life  learning,  such as daily con-
tact with  our parents, face-to-face interactions  with friends  and neigh-
borhood, watching  television and movies etc. This means that the frame-
work is largely biographically  determined  (Berger and  Berger 1976).
These  lived  experiences  are  then  typified  and  crystallized  into  rou-
tines  or rules  of thumb,  which  can be used as a skill  or problem-solv-
ing technique  in  everyday life.  As soon as we spot something,  we can
follow  the  established  interpretative  channel  and  have access to  all
knowledge, (meaning)  about  that thing  (deBono  1980).  It is like  driv-
ing a car. As soon as we are heading  on a familiar  road, we no longer
need to use a map,  ask a passerby, or read road  signs for  directions.
Similarly,  our interpretation  frameworks  continue  to search for famil-
iar roads that render  thinking  unnecessary. Furthermore,  the  stock of
knowledge  actors possess  is by no means homogeneous  (Schutz 1970).
Because of diverse experiences, human agents will respond  differently
I  to the  same objectively  defined  stimulus  (a'Driscoll  and Rizzo 1985;IYu 
1999).  In  Lachmann's  words  (1970),  "different  men  in  identical
I  situations  may act differently  because of  their  different  expectations
I of the  future."  In  short,  the  interpretation  framework  developed  inlour 
mind  allows us to  make sense of  the world  and  to  live.  Without
I  such a system, life  would  be impossible.
The  Hayekian perspective
The  Schutzian arguments  developed  in the previous  section can be re-
stated in the  Hayekian perspective.  In a classic cognitive  work,  Hayek
(1952)  argues that  the  process of  perception  of  external  events is a
complicated  undertaking,  involving  the  capacity to  identify,  imitate,
and  internalize  patterns  and  transfer  perception  across domains  of
space and  time.  Before  interpretation  is taken place,  agents have to
identify  certain  events, some of which  may have never been observed
before.  However, it is unlikely  that phenomena  are completely  novel;
"  For  an  exposition  concerning  entrepreneurial  learning  and  the  growth  of  knowledge  in the  Popperian
perspective,  see  Harper  (1996).Yu 261
rather  the  are likely to resemble something  that has been previously
experienc  d  (Hayek  1952; see also Fleetwood  [995).  Hayek  (1952)
describes t  is sensory perception  as "an act of classification."  In other
words, the  uman mind  is able to classify sensory elements and recog-
nize patter  s as "one  of the same kind"  even though  it has never been
experience  before.  During  the perception  process, the mind  is build-
ing up a re  ord  of  past stimuli  or, more  accurately, of associations or
connectio  s between  stimuli  with  which  to  compare  new incoming
stimuli.  In  ayek's (1952) words:
[W]hat  we perceive can never be unique  properties  of
individual  objects but always only properties,  which the ob-
jects ~ave in common  with  other objects. Perception  is thus
always  an interpretation,  the placing of something  into  one
or sev ral classes of objects.
If  the levent and  subsequent stimulus  have been  repeated  with
some mini$al  regularity,  a pattern  will  begin to  register  in the mind.
Each time  the same event and subsequent stimuli  is experienced,  the
same respo~se is achieved. This means that the impulse  travels via the
same route  forming  the same linkage  and establishing  the same fol-
lowing.  Th  result  is  that  these  events  are  classified  as the  same
(Fleetwood 1995). It is worth iterating  that perception  is founded  upon
the experience  of a person.  All  that is perceived  is immediately  con-
fronted  wit  classes  of  already recorded  data. Every perception  of a
new stimul  s, or class of stimuli,  will be influenced  by previous imple-
mented  cIa sifications.  A new phenomenon  will  always be perceived
in  associati  n with  other  events with  which  it has something  in com-
mon  (Haye  1952).
Rules and institutions:  cost-saving device
Due to the limits  of  our  reason, we follow  rules. Rules are the device
for  coping  with  our  ignorance.  The  whole  rationale  of rule-guided
action is to be found  in our inescapable ignorance  of most of particu-
lar circumsfrances which  determine  the effects of  our actions  (Hayek
1967). Rules facilitate  the decisionmaking  in complex situations.  They
limit  our range of choice  by reducing  the  list of circumstances which
we need to take into  account in particular  circumstances, singling  out
certain  classes of facts as alone  determining  the  general  kind  of ac-
tion  which we should  take (Hayek 1964).  In Hayek's words (1962):PHI4PPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 262
i  Rules, tacitly understood  and unconsciously  followed,
will  often  merely determine  or limit  the range of possibili-
ties within  which  the  choice  is made consciously.  By elimi-
nating  certain kinds  of action altogether  and providing  cer-
tain  routine  ways of  achieving  the  object,  they  merely  re-
strift  the  alternatives  on  which  a conscious  choice  is re-
quired.
The  moral  rules, for  example, which have become part
of  man's nature  will  mean that certain conceivable choices
wil  not appear at all among the possibilities  between which
he  hooses...[The]  rules which guide  an individual's  action
are  better  seen as determining  what he will  not  do  rather
th  n what he will  do.
Hehce,  "rules...do  not govern only our actions. They also govern
our  per~eption,  and  particularly  our  perceptions  of  other  people's
actions"  (Hayek 1962). Institutions  or "rules  of  doing  things"  can be
regarded  as common  schemes  of behavior,  which  simplify  the  complexity
of the world  and enable us to operate with a certain  degree of predict-
ability.  They standardize  the world  and help to solve problems  during
social interactions.  Different  individuals  act inside the world  and within
its limits,  which  ensure  order  and a certain  regularity  through  simpli-
fication.  Transition  in  the  cognitive  perspective  is thus  a process of
which  new rules replace old  rules, or new thinking  displaces old think-
ing.  In the  next  section, we shall explore  in detail  how the process of
transitiCln is initiated  and completed.
New opportunities,  mental  process, and economic  transition
Human  agents are not  passive robots.  They do  not  only  adapt them-
selves tJ the  external  world  but also adjust the  environment  to  their
needs through  deliberate  and conscious choices. Besides being diffus-
ers and users of knowledge,  agents are also a source of knowledge.  In
other  words, they are a builder  and user of knowledge,  creator of eco-
nomic  possesses  and, above  all, the  engine  of change  (Hayek  1952;
RiZZello J1999' 2000).  In this sense,  economic change is connected  with
the fact that human  agents constantly create the reasons for  their  own
existen  e, try to have influences  as much as possible and thus deter-
mine thie future  states of the world  in a direction  that favors their  own
development  (Rizzello  2000).  Suppose an external  event creates im-Yu 263
pulses to t~e perception  process. New impulses will  not be acted upon
immediately  in a stimulus-response  manner  or this would  produce  er-
ratic, behaviour.  Instead,  they will  be assessed  by the mind  to see how
these new events fit  into  the  total picture  of the agent's mind.  Selec-
tion  of the appropriate  response involves not  only responding  to one
impulse  with  one  action,  but  also  drawing  upon  previous  record  of
associations (Fleetwood 1995). If some completely new pattern of events
cannot be classified, then the mental process enters a transitional  stage.
Agents are lunable  to perceive  and  classify action  that  they may have
never seen before,  and  thereby  initiate  an appropriate  response ac-
tion.  It follows  that a mechanism of  sensory pattern  transfer  is in op-
eration.  In other words, a pattern  learned  in one format  is transferred
to another  so that a pattern  is recognised  in a different  format.  With-
out  the  capacity to  transfer  a pattern  across fields,  agents would  be
incapable  of perceiving  any kind  of novel behavior  (Fleetwood 1995).
However, the established linkages of the mental  map often fail to
give an adequate  account  of the current  or immediate-future  environ-
ment  in  which  agents find  themselves  (i.e., a wrong  prediction).  In
other words, the stock of existing rules is inapplicable  to the new events.
If  this  is the  case, the  agent is  in  a state of  conflicting  experience,
those of the  model  conflicting  with  those of the  mental  map. The  re-
sult is a gradual  reclassification  of the  linkages and  new rules are re-
established  (Hayek  1952; Fleetwood  1995).  It  takes a long  period  of
time for the process to be completed. This reclassification process which
triggers new rules is the foundation  of understanding  transition.  A tran-
sition economy, in the cognitive perspective, is thus defined  as the situ-
ation where its people's  current  interpretation  framework  is outdated
and is unable  to cope with the rapidly  changing  external world.  At the
same time,  a  new framework  for  interpreting  new events or  solving
new problems  has not yet fully developed  in their  minds.  As a result, a
mental  gap occurs. In  other words, peoples'  interpretation  framework
is in a vacuum state. This  framework  vacuum is transition.12
The  process of transition:  from  perception  to market  selection
Although  transition  is a state of chaos, it does not mean that economic
activities  in  transition  economies  are at a standstill.  On the  contrary,
12  Thus,  my cognitive  perspective  on transition  is consistent  with  Hare's  view  (2001).  He describes  transi.
tion  economies  as  the  economies  where  important  institutions  have  not  been  created  and  that  the  rei.
evant  laws  were  incomplete,  imperfectly  enforced,  or still  subject  to serious  political  controversy.PHILIPPINE  JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT
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transition  should  be viewed as a dynamic process in which people are
struggling  to  reestablish  a new interpretation  framework.  In this  sec-
tion,  we try to explore  what will  happen  during  the process of transi-
tion  or more  precisely,  how "the  act of  reclassification"  leads to  the
change  in the  society's  stock of knowledge  and,  consequently, rees-
tablishes new institutions.  To do so, we utilize  Hayek's theory ofspon-
taneous order  (1967).
Actors'  subjective  interpretation  of  incoming  events and  the
choice  of an option  are subject to social tests. Social selection  in eco-
nomic  perspective, analogous to  natural  selection  in biology,  consists
of three  parts:  variation,  selection,  and  retention.13  Variation  occurs
through  human  agency. Selection  in the  economy operates  over ob-
jects  that  vary from  time  to  time  by rules  or paradigms  and  through
the  realization  of  cost and benefit.  Through  filtering  processes,  those
whose chosen option  happens  to lead to benefits  will  be weeded in.
Otherwise,  those whose chosen option  happens to lead to losses will
be screened out.  Self-interest governs social selection.  Once  new ways
of  doing  things  are found  to be feasible, people  will use them repeat-
edly. In  other words, these rules are adopted.  As mentioned,  rules are
the  device  for  coping  with  our  ignorance.  They  facilitate
decisionmaking  in complex situations. By trial and error,  learning  and
experimenting,  new rules emerge and serve as a new stock of knowl-
edge.  A  dynamic  theory  of  transition  is  thus  based  upon  the
conceptualization  of  processes of  perception,  experimentation  and
social learning.  From this cognitive  perspective, we are now able to say
something  about the length  of the transition  period.  Firstly, the deeper
culture,  and  social knowledge  are embedded,  the  longer  time  agents
will  need to  unlock  old  systems  and, therefore,  the  longer  the transi-
tion  period  will  be. Where  culture  is so deeply  rooted,  moderate  re-
form package to enhance unlearning  or change may be rendered  inef-
fective.  Thus,  a more  radical  approach  is required  to  unlearn.  Such
"In  biology, organisms were traditionally  regarded as the objects of selection. Recently, genes became
the main objects of selection.  Variation occurs in each generation.  It implies  that the array of objects
present at any time is heterogeneous.  Some objects can adapt to the current environment better than
others and therefore will have more "successes." They are more likely to be "selected" by the system
whereas others will be more likely to be rejected.  Greater fitness traditionally  implied (probabilistically)
differential  reproductive  success  Today, fitness  is given by Hamilton's  concept of "inclusive fitness."
Retention is memory. To  survive, selected variations must persist  somehow. Retention is achieved mostly
through genes (Langlois and KoppI1994).Yu 265
radical  approach  may take in the form  of political  revolution  and vio-
lence which are unavoidably  painful  and bloody.  Secondly, the longer
time  it takes for people  to interpret  external  events, unlearn  obsolete
knowledge  and learn  new things, the  longer  the  transition  period  will
be.  This  argument  can be evidenced  by the  fact  that  the  European
Union  (EU)  accession countries14 learn  faster  than  most Common-
wealth  of Independent  States (CIS)  (IMF  2001). The  reason is essen-
tiallya  problem of mental perception,  classification and learning. Those
nations  which  are  closer to  EU and therefore  with  significant  under-
standing  of a market-based  economy  will  learn  the  western style of
market  system faster.  In  contrast,  most of the  CIS countries  have no
obvious  alternative  model  to follow.  With  almost 70 years of  central
planning,  these CIS nations  have little  knowledge  of the  operation  of
a market-based  economy and therefore  learned  new capitalist  way of
doing  things  in a much  slower pace.
The future  of  transition  economies: a journey  into  the  unknown
Where  are these transition  economies heading? For most neoclassical
and new institutional  scholars, the answer is toward a market economy.
In fact,  most policymakers  including  the staffs of IMF and the World
Bank believe  that these economies should  develop a form  of western
style of market  economy.  For IMF  (2001), "building  effective  market-
economy  institutions  is  central  to  long-term  growth  prospects  in  all
countries, but is particularly  relevant for the transition  economies, given
the  inadequacy  of  their  pre transition  institutional  arrangements."
Hence  for  IMF,  the  role  of  the  government  in  the  transition  econo-
mies should  shift from  direct  intervention  in economic  activities to an
agency involving  the  establishment  and  enforcement  of the  "rules  of
the  game"  (IMF  2001).  Moving  toward  a western  style  of  market
economy is  only  one  of  many possible  destinations.  In  fact, as Hare
(2001) points  out, some of the transition  economies may not even wish
to transform  themselves into  market-type  economies.  In our subjectiv-
ist perspective,  the  answer is that these economies  do not  necessarily
move to the  western style of  market  economies  or return  to previous
communist  regimes. Instead, they take on ajourney  into  the unknown.
This  is the essence of Austrian  evolutionism.
'4  The EU has accepted 10 transition economies as full candidates. They are Bulgaria, the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia (IMF  2001).2661
According  to  Carl  Menger,  there  are two  types of  institutions,
namely, designed and undesigned.15  While  both are created by human
agents, they differ  in one essential way, that  is, whether  they were an-
ticipated  or not.  The  former  type arises because of a common  will  di-
rected  toward  its creation,  and the  result is more  or less anticipated.
The latter is "the unintended  result of innumerable  efforts of economic
subjects pursuing  individual  interests"  (Menger 1985[1883]).  It is the
unanticipated  consequence of purposive  human  action.
A striking  feature  of the Austrian  theory  of  transition  is that hu-
man agents are creating  a system which  they do not know in advance.
Though  manmade,  that  is, the  result of  economizing  actions, institu-
tions  are largely  not  designed, nor the intended  product  of these ac-
tions  (Hayek 1979).  In  fact, Hayek conte~ds  that  human  agents are
creating  something  they never  know, regardless of whether  the emerg-
ing systems  are efficient  or not.  In Hayek's words  (1979):
...Many of the greatest things  man has achieved are the
result  not  of consciously directed  thought,  and still less the
product  of a deliberately  coordinated  efforts  of  many indi-
viduals, but of a process in which the  individual  plays a part
which he can never fully  understand.
This  argument  sharply contrasts with the  new institutional  belief
that  human  institutions  are constructed  as a result  of  the  maximiza-
tion  of human  choice  under  constraints.  Rather, they are the result of
a long-term  evolutionary  process of learning,  creating and experiment-
ing.  For this, Weisskopfnotes  (1997):
What  is striking  is  that,  in  a  number  of  important
spheres, the economic  reforms  have worked  out in a differ-
ent way than  initially  intended...popular  values and  expec-
tations  rooted  in Russian culture  have reacted to the  shock
therapy reforms  in such a way as  to generate a new economic
situation  that is neither  a normal western-style capitalist sys-
tem nor a traditional  Soviet-style socialist system.
15  Based  on  Carl  Menger,  Langlois  (1986)  argues  that  institutions  can  be  pragmatic  or organic.  Pragmatic
institutions  comprise  rules  directed  toward  specific  ends.  Conscious  intentions  play  an  important  role  if
the  institution  is  not very  complex  and  confined  to a  relative  short  time  perspective,  so  that  the  original
intentions  of the  founder  can  influence  the  shape  of the  institution  However,  institutions  can  also  be the
unintended  consequence  of  human  action.  The  rules  of thumbs  operating  evolve  over  time  into  an  insti-
tution  that  no one  has  expected  to emerge,  although  it is the  result  of the  human  economizing  effort.Yu 267
In  Peter Earl's words  (1998),  transition  economies are "heading
for ajourney  into  the unknown."  Assisted by IMF or World  Bank, these
transition  economies  may move to the western style of  market  econo-
mies, but  they are indeed  evolving into  something  that no one knows,
just like  the time  when human agents created the astonishing  commu-
nist regime  in 1917.
Resistance to change during  transition
Russians reported  resisted the  unfolding  change  in Russia in  recent
years due to the dramatic  fall  in the economic  output.  Suffering  from
poverty  amid  a chaotic  economy, some Russians expressed a wish to
return  to  the  "good  old  days" of  the  communist  regime.  To  explain
the  resistance to  change, new institutional  economists stress transac-
tion  costs and  capabilities.16 For a capabilities  explanation  of institu-
tions  and inertia,  see Langlois  and  Robertson (1995).
Public  Choice  school  emphasizes  rentseeking  activities. I'  For
Cheung  (1982),  institutional  change depends on two types of transac-
tion  costs: 1) the  costs of  operating  the  system (costs of  delineating
and policing  rights,  negotiating,  and enforcing  contracts),  and 2) the
costs of  institutional  change  encompassing costs such as discovering
alternative  institutions  or  persuading  people  to  adopt  change.ls  In
Cheung's  view, the  broader  the  range  of  methods  or techniques  for
making production  decisions, the lower the cost of production.  Cheung
(1982)  concludes  that the  relative  lack of  institutional  choice  under
communism  means that the costs of operating  the system  are necessar-
ily  higher  than  those  of  a private  enterprise  system. His  arguments
imply  that if  the  cost of discovering  alternative  institutions  or persua-
sion is relatively  high,  then existing  institutions  will persist.
In  the  evolutionary  literature,  persistence  of  institutions  is
largely explained  by the  concept of path  dependence,  which suggests
that  lock-in  effects and  inefficient  behaviors  may persist and  that his-
tory matters in explaining  institutional  deficiencies  (Arthur  1989; David
1995).19  Path dependence  plays an important  role  in North's  (1992)
'.For  a capabilities explanation of institutions and inertia, see Langlois and Robertson (1995).
'7 For public choice scholars, adherence to reform trap is attributable to rent seeking activities  To  escape
the under-reform trap, Aslund,  Boone and Johnson  (2001) suggest inducing competition to break mo-
nopoly
,. Langlois and Robertson (1995) refer to the costs of discovery, persuading, and teaching other market
participants as "dynamic transaction costs"
'9 For a discussion of the effect of pathJ:jependence on the transformation of Central European countries,
see Chavance and Magnin (1997)2681
adaptive  efficiency  framework.  For  North,  the  complementarities,
economies  of scope, and network externalities  bias change in favor of
the  interests of the existing  organizations.  In North's  view (1992).
...The  interests  of these existing  organizations,  which
produce  path  dependence,  and  the  mental  models  of the
entrepreneurs,  which produce  ideologies, rationalize  the ex-
isting  institutional  matrix  and  therefore  bias the  actors in
favor of policies  conceived to be in the interests of existing
organizations.
Our  cognitive  perspective  casts light  on  institutional  inertia  or
resistance to change during  transition.  Persistence of an old  system is
fundamentally  associated with  mental thinking.  As mentioned  earlier,
the society's total  stock of knowledge  is a product  of mental interpre-
tation,  reclassification and learning.  Agents'  interpretation  process has
a certain  time  sequence that allows thinking  to  follow  a routine  per-
ception  track.  In  other  words, agents see things  in a certain  way and
expect things  to be worked  out  in a certain way. Once the incoming
information  is organized into a (mental)  pattern,  then the agents' sub-
jective  interpretation  framework  no  longer  has to analyze or catego-
rize incoming  information.  All  that is required  is to have enough in-
formation  to trigger  the pattern.  The mind  then follows  along the pat-
tern  automatically  in the same way as a driver  follows  a familiar  road.
Over time,  a habit  develops because the  actor  simply uses his or  her
interpretation  system routinely.  Resistance to  change means that ac-
tors'  thinking  is locked  up in old  interpretation  structures, concepts
and institutions  (deBono  1992).
Two other points  are worth  mentioning.  Firstly, once agents take
the  stock of  knowledge  for  granted,  then  perception  becomes even
more  important,  because how they look  at a situation  will  determine
what  they can do  about  it.  Secondly, unless  another  competing  pat-
tern  is developed  in the  agent's  interpretation  framework,  anything
similar  to the established  pattern  will  be treated just  as if  it were that
pattern.  It is just  like  the watershed to a valley. Unless there  is a com-
peting vall.ey,  water will gather into  the centre of the single valley. When
an economy's  stock of knowledge  is seen as a product  of  social con-
struction,  rules  or moral  norms are then followed  relatively uncondi-
tionally,  since the  behavior  prescribed  by them is considered  "right."
If individuals  act against these rules,  then  they will  have a "bad con-Yu 269
science."  Hence,  an institution  is reinforced  during  the process of so-
cialization  when individuals  learn  to behave according  to the  "right"
rules of the game that constitute  the  society they live  in  (Ackermann
1998).
It  may be argued  that  to  prevent  institutional  inertia  and ac-
celerate  transition  process, whenever interpreting  incoming  events is
necessary, actors should  not  take  their  experience  or knowledge  for
granted.  Unfortunately,  as Allen  and  Haas  (2001)  notes, all psycho-
logical  change is very hard  to  bring  about.  Often,  individuals  are un-
willing  to  let  go  of existing  concepts, perceptions  or institutions  in
their  desire  to  put  both  previous  and  recent  experiences  into  a new
perspective. As this paper has explained,  rule  following  has its merits.
Mter  a period  of time, as the pattern  in agents' minds survives for too
long,  it will become nonseparable and resist disruption.  In other words,
over time  each piece  of  knowledge  works  together,  forming  an inte-
grated  part of the thinking  pattern,  and is reinforced  by social norms,
customs, and  routines.  By that  time,  changing  patterns  will  become
extremely  difficult  (deBono  1992).  This  is the  case of North  Korea.
Unless there  are Schumpeterian  innovations  which  revolutionize  the
way of  doing  things,  old  thinking  will  persist as long  as agents take
experiences  for  granted  unconditionally  and  interpret  the  external
world  in a routine  manner.
Two routes  of  economic reform:  gradualism vis-a.-vis  shock therapia
If  we  accept  the  argument  that  economic  transition  is a matter  of
change  in  mental  perception,  then  our  framework  can shed light  on
the understanding  of two types of  reform,  namely, gradualism,  as ex-
emplified  by the reform  in mainland  China; and the shock therapy, as
exemplified  by the reform  in Russia. Gradualism is notably incremen-
tal in nature.  In the 1980s,  the Chinese government  steadily introduced
the economic  reforms.  Rather  than admitting  the acceptance of capi-
talism, the Deng government  subtly termed the reform  modernization,
or  "adoption  of  a  market  system under  socialism."  This  gradual  re-
form  policy  had one advantage. Chinese people  could  partially  main-
tain  their  old thinking  while  at the same time  learn new ways of doing.
Starting  in the agricultural  sector, the government  de facto introduced
20  Due  to limitations  of  space,  my application  here  can  only  be illustrative.  Further  research  along  this  line
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a private  property  rights system  labeled  "agricultural  responsibility  sys-
tern." This  new policy served as a small impulse  to the people's  minds.
Innovative  opportunities  began to be perceived  by farmers  and  rural
workers.  At first,  farmers  did  not  know what to do.  During  that  time,
they were  still  using  the  same old  interpretation  framework  to  deal
with  new events. Many of them dared  not move ahead. This was espe-
cially true  for those people who suffered  intense  hardship  during  the
Cultural  Revolution.  With  socialist thinking  being  still in force  in most
farmers'  mind  at the  early stage of  the  reform,  those people  moving
ahead and behaving as rural  entrepreneurs  were condemned  by other
farmers  as capitalists'  devils. However,  as many  rural  entrepreneurs
became wealthy and did  not  suffer  from  any political  condemnation,
old thinking  started to give way. As more farmers learned,  new policies
were found  feasible. More precisely, Chinese people  slowly constructed
a new framework  to  deal with  the  capitalist  way of  doing  things.  Such
mentality  gained  ground  and was reinforced  by continuous  rewards.
With the success  in the rural  sector, similar reforms were then extended
to the  industrial  sector under  the name Bao Chan Dao Hu (a contract-
ing  system)  .21  More  and more  people  accepted the  new way of  doing
things.  Even most conservative communist  cadres were later willing  to
unlearn  and  learn.  They gave up  their  radical  communist  ideology.
They participated  in the  market ways of doing  things  and joined  pri-
vate enterprises.  A  new social stock of knowledge  was steadily being
built  up as these activities were extended  to the whole economy. Chi-
nese people  developed the  ability  to  interpret  new global events with-
out  much  difficulty.  As they shared  the  same expectation,  economic
activities  in China  could  be coordinated  at relatively  lower costs. This
explains  the success of China's  reform.
Contrary  to the  gradualist  approach,  the  shock therapy  (or big-
bang  strategy)  requires  people  to  give  up  entirely  all  their  existing
stocks of  knowledge  at one  time.  Actors  totally  unlearn  old  ways of
doing  things  and learn  new things  in a very short period  of time. This
involves revolutionary  learning.22 In Russia, it means that people aban-
21 Many  types  of  contracting  system  were  practiced  during  the  experimentation  period.  For a  detail  dis-
cussion,  see  Shiu  (1997).
22  Revolutionary  learning  can  be seen  as "a process  of de institutionalization  or unlearning  in which  anoma-
lies  with  established  knowledge  embedded  in  structuration  principles  and  properties  are  discovered"
(Stein  1997).
23  An  old  way  of thinking  is a strong  desire  for  equal  distribution  of income.  Another  example  is specula-
tion.  Speculation  was  also  regarded  as  a  criminal  activity  and  was  condemned.  On  the  other  hand,  in
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  countries,  no living  memory  of a  market  economy  remains.  For  a
review  of  old  ways  of thinking,  see  Allen  and  Haas  (2001).Yu 271
doned  all communist  teachings which  they had  taken for granted  for
many years and accepted capitalists'  ways of doing  things.23  This  had
created  a shock in the  mental  process. The  Russians suddenly found
that their stocks of knowledge were incapable  to solve their  daily prob-
lems.  In  other  words, shared  expectation  disappeared.  Coordination
failed.  As a result,  production  and economic  activities were in chaos.
This  explains  the fact that in the  transition  economies of  Central and
Eastern Europe,  the  Baltics,  Russia, and  the  other  countries  of  the
former  Soviet Union,  output  fell by more  than 40 percent  on average.
Such  real  output  loss was accompanied  by severe dislocations,  large
redistribution  of  income,  and  severe income  losses by  many people
(Fischer 2001)  .
Given the dramatic  fall  in the output  and suffering  from  extreme
hardship  during  the reform,  a lot of Russians  with  their old interpreta-
tion  framework  being  still  in force  in their  minds  may perceive  that it
is easier to cope with  everyday life  under  the  communist  system than
in the  transition  stage. Therefore,  some of  them started to miss their
good  old  Bolshevik  days. Their  minds  still  strongly  valued  economic
stability  and desired security under  the communist  regime  (Weisskopf
1997). This explains  why some Russians  resisted the economic  reform.
As stated earlier,  a successful economic  reform  requires  a change  in
mentality.  Mter  all,  a human  institution  is not "an objective  physical
phenomenon,  but a human  mental construct"  (Stein 1997). On  this, a
policy  reform  package that aims to  help people  to  learn  new things  is
of utmost important.
Conclusion
The cognitive  approach presented  in this paper represents an alterna-
tive to social engineering  approach prescribed  by the mainstream neo-
classical school and property  rights  perspective articulated  in the evo-
lutionary  institutional  paradigm.  This cognitive  approach attempts  to
understand  transition  and  institutional  change  in  the  theory  of hu-
man action.  It  starts with  humanist  elements, including  perception,
learning,  errors,  expectation,  and experimentation,  and extends  the
humanistic  analysis to economic  phenomena  in transition  economies.
In  this  way, understanding  transition  has its arguments firmly  rooted
in human agency. So far, the cognitive  approach to understand  transi-
tion  and  institutional  change  is rare  and  this  paper provides  only a
schematic  explanation  of some transition  issues. Further  cognitive  re-
search in  transition  is called  for.PHILIPPINE  jOURNAL  OF DEVELOPMENT 272
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